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JIM TIMMERBERG | Class Actions
Ohio’s Savings Statute Cannot be Applied to Cases Initially Filed in Another State’s Federal Court
Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, permits a plaintiff whose claims are led within
the applicable statute of limitations, but then dismissed otherwise on mer- its, to re le their claims within one year. Courts have noted the forgiving nature of the statute, explaining that it “is a remedial statute and is to be giv- en a liberal construction to permit the decision of cases upon their merits rather than upon mere technicalities of procedure.” Vitantonio v. Baxter, 2006 WL 847229, 2006-Ohio-1685 (11th Dist. 2006).
court, relying on Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.2d 130, 283 N.E.2d 167 (1972). In Howard, the court held “[a] suit in another state can no more toll the Ohio statute, applicable to suits in Ohio, than an unexpired claim under the statute of another state can operate to lift the statute of limitation and thereby make the saving clause available.” The trial court adopted the reasoning of Howard and dismissed the action.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that “R.C. 2305.19 permits a plaintiff,
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, looking to the Ohio Civil Rules of Procedure for guidance and expanding its earlier holding in Howard. The court referenced its reasoning in Howard, holding that the rules did not intend for “an action led in a foreign state be considered “commencement” or “attempted commencement” for purposes of applying Ohio procedural law.” In so nding, the court reasoned that Civ.R. 3(A) de nes “commencement” as “(1) ling a complaint with the court and (2) obtaining service within one
Recently, in Portee v. Cleveland ‘[i]n any action that is commenced,’ year from the ling.” It went on to Clinic Foundation, 2018 WLtore lehisorhercasewithinonestatethat“theword“court,”asused 3913661, 2018-Ohio-3263, the Ohio year after the action has failed in Civ.R. 3(A) refers to an Ohio
Supreme Court considered how liberally the savings statute should be construed, determining whether, when a party initially les their action in federal court in another state, and the case fails otherwise than on the merits, the savings statute can be utilized to timely re le the action in an Ohio state court.
In Portee, an Indiana resident traveled to the Cleveland Clinic to have surgery on her elbow. Complications required that she have a second surgery. On October 2, 2013, she led a medical malpractice action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Cleveland Clinic and several of its doctors. On July 28, 2014, the court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Less than a year later, on July 17, 2015, the plaintiff re led the action in an Ohio state court. The Cleveland Clinic moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the savings statute applied only to cases which were originally led in an Ohio state
otherwise than upon the merits, even if the applicable statute of limitations has expired” and “does not specify in which court an action must be commenced for the savings statute to apply.” Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2017-Ohio- 1053, 80 N.E.3d 556, 7-8. The court distinguished the holding in Howard on the basis that that the court in that case was concerned with cases rst led in state courts, not federal courts. The court also referenced the strong policy considerations behind the savings statute, relying on Kinney v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., 30 Ohio App.3d 123, 126, 507 N.E.2d 402 (10th Dist.1986), in which the court stated “we are in accord with the view expressed by Chief Justice Weygandt concerning the savings statute. He stated the statute is “broad and unambiguous” and should be “liberally construed in order that controversies be decided upon important substantive questions rather than upon technicalities of procedure.”
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court,sinceRule1(A)providesthat the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure be limited to “courts of this state.” Portee at 12, quoting Howard at 135.
Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that “[t]he saving statute applies to “any action.” Portee at 42. He noted that “[b]ecause any action includes all actions and every action, it necessarily applies to actions commenced in other states, whether in state or federal court. We would have to add language to the saving statute to limit it to ‘any action that is commenced, or attempted to be commenced,’ in Ohio.”
Ultimately, the court’s holding expressly expanded its earlier pronouncement in Howard, meaning that any case led in another state’s court, or in a federal
court of another state, cannot utilize Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, to later re le the action in an Ohio state court.
Jim Timmerberg represents plaintiffs in class action suits and complex commercial litigation matters. In addi- tion to earning his Juris Doctor from Case Western Reserve University. Jim holds a master’s degree in European history.
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